Evil as Evidence for God
11 comments | PermalinkIt was William Lane Craig, I believe, whom I first saw formulate the syllogism in this way:
1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2. Objective moral values exists (i.e., evil is real, not illusory).
3. Therefore, God exists.
The fact that atheists must presuppose the very thing they intend to deny fits well with the colorful illustrations that Cornelius Van Til used to use in order to demonstrate the fundamental inconsistencies of all non-Christian worldviews. Van Til argued that non-Christians were operating on "borrowed capital"--using the Christian worldview in order to destroy it. They couldn't help themselves. They need to use fundamentally theistic categories--like laws of science, morality, and logic--as tools to defeat theism, and yet they cannot account for them on their worldview.
Van Til compared this to a little girl sitting in her father's lap, slapping him in the face. She must be supported by him in order to rebel against him. Another time he spoke of the futility of non-Christian thought as being like a man made out of water using a ladder made out of water in order to climb up out of water!
Stand to Reason's Greg Koukl would not, I believe, want to be lumped in with Van Til, but I think that his article on "Evil as Evidence for God" is a fine illustration of the way in which non-Christians presuppose what they intend to deny. Here's how Greg begins:
Read the whole thing.The presence of evil in the world is considered by some to be solid evidence against the existence of God. I think it proves just the opposite. The entire objection hinges on the observation that true evil exists "out there" as an objective feature of the world. Therein lies the problem for the atheist.
To say something is evil is to make a moral judgment, and moral judgments make no sense outside of the context of a moral standard. Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from that standard of morality. If there is no standard, there is no departure.
Evil can't be real if morals are relative. Evil is real, though. That's why people object to it. Therefore, objective moral standards must exist as well. This discovery invites certain questions. Where do morals come from and why do they seem to apply only to human beings? Are they the product of chance? What world view makes sense out of morality?
We can answer these questions by simply reflecting on the nature of a moral rule. By making observations about the effect--morality--we can then determine its characteristics and then ask what cause is adequate to produce it.
posted by JT at Tuesday, November 15, 2005
11 Comments:
Great post. Thanks for the Van Til illustration. I did a post about this at my blog a few days ago with a nice C.S. Lewis quote you might like: Whose Problem of Evil? I second the reccomendation of the Koukl article.
Jeremy
http://withallyourmind.net
I just wrote a small paper on this subject and argued the same way. We must still recognize that the atheist can deny the existence of evil and still use it in critiquing the Christian Worldview by challenging the consistency of holding to the existence of evil while believing in an omnipotent, omniscient God. In defending Christianity against this charge, I think Van Til, Clark and Frame have a much better approach than Craig.
A good argument! I've alos posted this on my weblog. What is the source of your morality?
Patrick
ShareYourFaith.org
I completely agree. Ravi Zacharias has put out excellent material on this.
JT said: It was William Lane Craig, I believe, whom I first saw formulate the syllogism in this way:
1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2. Objective moral values exists (i.e., evil is real, not illusory).
3. Therefore, God exists.
In regards to this argument, isn't Craig assuming that the God he is attempting to prove is a God of moral values? I think it is inconsistant for a Christian to argue in such a way. According to a Biblical world view, Christians know that God's existance is not dependant on the existance of objective moral values; but rather, objective moral values are a reality because God exists. I just don't think you can start the arguement for God that way. I mean, we are making massive assumptions before we even write the word, "If." Like, the symbols that create these words mean something to the reader; this will form an arguement that will make sense or not make sense to the reader, etc. Assumptions, like Van Til pointed out, are assumed by all people who open their mouths in order to argue.
derek,
The argument only implies that our knowledge of God's existence depends (at least partially) on the existence of moral values. We know God exists because we know there are absolute moral laws. But this doesn't mean that God's actual existence depends on the existence of moral values.
Or to put in another way: in terms of epistemology, moral values precede God; but in terms of ontology, God precedes moral values.
David,
Thanks for the thoughts. I am going to think about them tonight and hopefully post a response tomorrow.
Derek
David said: "The argument only implies that our knowledge of God's existence depends (at least partially) on the existence of moral values. We know God exists because we know there are absolute moral laws. But this doesn't mean that God's actual existence depends on the existence of moral values.
Or to put in another way: in terms of epistemology, moral values precede God; but in terms of ontology, God precedes moral values."
Thank you for the clarification. My explanation was a little fuzzy. And I agree with you that God's actual existence is not dependent on the existence of moral laws. I just have a hard time agreeing with the idea that "we know God exists because we know there are absolute moral laws." In my understanding, the phrase, "absolute moral laws" wouldn't even make sense (i.e. how do we ‘know’ that moral laws exist) unless a God of absolute moral law (not just a ‘god’) existed. So, epistemologically, I would contend that our knowledge of absolute moral laws does not precede our knowledge of God; namely the true God of the Bible. If we first don't admit that we presuppose the God of the Bible (as Christians), then we have to demonstrate to philosophically adept unbelievers that we are making MASSIVE logical jumps from "If moral laws exist" to "[then] God exists," as in the first premise of the arguement. Why does one lead to the other? Is it valid to make that jump? Sharp unbelievers will not think so.
All that to say, I think we are playing on the unbeliever’s ‘home court’ when we seek to use arguments like Craig’s to prove the existence of God. We don’t need to prove it. The unbeliever already knows God exists and their unbelief is not a matter of knowledge; it is a matter of rebellion which will play itself out in a ‘foolish’ world-view (Psalm 14:1). That is why I appreciate Koukl’s argument using the existence of evil, especially his question, “What world view makes sense out of morality?” That’s where the battle needs to be fought in my estimation; on the level of world-view.
Derek
I don't think we should limit our truth tests to existential viability. Many scholars think a good worldview should also include logical coherence and factual adequacy to be complete (See Ronald Nash, Faith & Reason, p. 51-66).
And I agree that the non-Christian suppresses his knowledge of God. The problem is that he won't admit this when questioned. You can't approach a non-believer and simply say, "You know, you really believe in God. Look, it says right here in Romans 1 that you do."
That's why I think arguments are helpful for promoting the Christian worldview--it shows we are willing to find a common ground and dialogue with unbelievers in a rational manner.
Of course, there is so much more to evangelism than apologetics and good arguments. We need to embody Christ's love to unbelievers and have integrity in our dealings with them. This is just as important.
I don't know if Van Til meant this as a response to the problem of evil, but if it it's then it's completely fallacious. The problem of evil is a problem for theism. It's of the following form:
1. You Christian believe in God and evil.
2. God and evil are inconsistent.
3. Therefore, your beliefs are inconsistent.
Even if the idea of evil depends on the idea of God, this argument against theism is perfectly fine if the second premise is true. The fact that evil makes no sense in the atheistic context is simply irrelevant. This is a problem for theists, not a problem for atheists. It's a problem of inconsistency. What's true or not true if atheism is true is completely irrelevant to what's true if Christianity is true, and the second question is what matters for the consistency issue.
Now it's possible that Van Til is making a different point. If all he's saying is that some people believe in the kind of evil that only makes sense with a God, and then they deny God, that would be a problem for the atheist. The only thing I'd say then is that it's not clear that any careful atheist believes in that kind of evil. It depends entirely on their meta-ethical theory backing their moral views. If they believe in a divine command theory but deny God, then they're inconsistent. There are other views in meta-ethics, however. I don't think most of them really serve as a foundation for ethics, but that just means ethics for them is groundless. It's not an inconsistency, which is what Van Til wants to make it.
Oh, on the relation of Van Til and Clark, I think one crucial factor is being ignored (one Frame is aware of but Van Til is hopelessly ignorant of). Van Til accepts what he calls transcendental arguments for the existence of God. He says we all assume various things that make sense only if God exists. Then he argues for God on the basis of those things. What he inconsistently then does is he says there are all these classical arguments for God's existence that play on the enemy's field and only grant things the other side will admit.
The problem with this approach is twofold. First is that his arguments that he calls transcendental are really the same kind of argument as all the classical ones he hates. The cosmological argument, for instance, points out that we all assume that things need explanations, and it proceeds to say that the notion of explanation makes sense only if we can explain things ultimately, in terms of God. It starts with a premise that some might deny, and it proves God. But denying the premise to get out of the argument requires denying something that we all assume. This is as true for cosmological arguments as it is for moral arguments like the one this post is about. Frame is aware of this and thus accepts cosmological arguments as legitimate in a presuppositional framework. But the problem is that it now makes presuppositionalism meaningless. Any classical argument can take this form. Figure out what premise it relies on that assumes something everyone already believes, and you've found something that serves as a transcendental argument. You've found something that makes sense only if God exists, and you've committed anyone believing it to the existence of God.
The other problem with Van Til's approach is that all the objections he raises against classical arguments will apply to his arguments. You can resist the cosmological argument by insisting that some facts (in particular the existence of contingent things) should need no explanation. You can resist the moral argument by insisting that the concept of morality makes perfect sense without God. You can resist the mathematical argument he gives by saying mathematics has no connection whatsoever with the idea of God (and it doesn't obviously have any such connection, nor does scripture ever act as if it does). Every negative thing Van Til says about classical arguments applies in full to the transcendental arguments he gives. Gordon Clark saw this. He just wrongly thought that was a problem for those arguments and ended up with no positive apologetic at all rather than the radically tiny one Van Til offers.
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